What changed, Regulation (EC) No 715/2009

+ 2.2. ***Congestion management procedures in the event of contractual congestion***
+ 
+ 2.2.1. **General Provisions**
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+ 1. The provisions of point 2.2 shall apply to interconnection points between adjacent entry-exit systems, irrespective of whether they are physical or virtual, between two or more Member States or within the same Member State in so far as the points are subject to booking procedures by users. They m…
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+ 2. On the basis of the information published by the transmission system operators pursuant to Section 3 of this Annex and, where appropriate, validated by national regulatory authorities, the Agency shall publish by 1 March of every year, commencing with the year 2014, a monitoring report on congest…
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+ 3. Any additional capacity made available through the application of one of the congestion-management procedures as provided for in points 2.2.2, 2.2.3, 2.2.4 and 2.2.5 shall be offered by the respective transmission system operator(s) in the regular allocation process.
+ 
+ 4. The measures provided for in points 2.2.2, 2.2.4 and 2.2.5 shall be implemented as of 1 October 2013. Points 2.2.3(1) to 2.2.3(5) shall apply as of 1 July 2016.
+ 
+ 2.2.2. **Capacity increase through oversubscription and buy-back scheme**
+ 
+ 1. Transmission system operators shall propose and, after approval by the national regulatory authority, implement an incentive-based oversubscription and buy-back scheme in order to offer additional capacity on a firm basis. Before implementation, the national regulatory authority shall consult wit…
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+ 2. The oversubscription and buy-back scheme shall provide transmission system operators with an incentive to make available additional capacity, taking account of the technical conditions, such as the calorific value, temperature and expected consumption, of the relevant entry-exit system and the ca…
+ 
+ 3. The oversubscription and buy-back scheme shall be based on an incentive regime reflecting the risks of transmission system operators in offering additional capacity. The scheme shall be structured in such a way that revenues from selling additional capacity and costs arising from the buy-back sch…
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+ 4. For the purpose of determining transmission system operators’ revenues, technical capacity, in particular surrendered capacity as well as, where relevant, capacity arising from the application of firm day-ahead use-it-or-lose-it and long term use-it-or-lose-it mechanisms, shall be considered to b…
+ 
+ 5. In determining the additional capacity, the transmission system operator shall take into account statistical scenarios for the likely amount of physically unused capacity at any given time at interconnection points. It shall also take into account a risk profile for offering additional capacity w…
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+ 6. Where necessary to maintain system integrity, transmission system operators shall apply a market-based buy-back procedure in which network users can offer capacity. Network users shall be informed about the applicable buy-back procedure. The application of a buy-back procedure is without prejudic…
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+ 7. Transmission system operators shall, before applying a buy-back procedure, verify whether alternative technical and commercial measures can maintain system integrity in a more cost-efficient manner.
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+ 8. When proposing the oversubscription and buy-back scheme the transmission system operator shall provide all relevant data, estimates, and models to the national regulatory authority in order for the latter to assess the scheme. The transmission system operator shall regularly report to the nationa…
+ 
+ 2.2.3. **Firm day-ahead use-it-or-lose-it mechanism**
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+ 1. National regulatory authorities shall require transmission system operators to apply at least the rules laid down in paragraph 3 per network user at interconnection points with respect to altering the initial nomination if, on the basis of the yearly monitoring report of the Agency in accordance …
+ 
+ (a) for at least three firm capacity products with a duration of one month or
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+ (b) for at least two firm capacity products with a duration of one quarter or
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+ (c) for at least one firm capacity product with a duration of one year or more or
+ 
+ (d) where no firm capacity product with a duration of one month or more has been offered.
+ 
+ 2. If, on the basis of the yearly monitoring report, it is shown that a situation as defined in paragraph 1 is unlikely to reoccur in the following three years, for example as a result of capacity becoming available from physical expansion of the network or termination of long-term contracts, the re…
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+ 3. Firm renomination is permitted up to 90 % and down to 10 % of the contracted capacity by the network user at the interconnection point. However, if the nomination exceeds 80 % of the contracted capacity, half of the non-nominated volume may be renominated upwards. If the nomination does not excee…
+ 
+ 4. The original holder of the contracted capacity may renominate the restricted part of its contracted firm capacity on an interruptible basis.
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+ 5. Paragraph 3 shall not apply to network users — persons or undertakings and the undertakings they control pursuant to Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 — holding less than 10 % of the average technical capacity in the preceding year at the interconnection point.
+ 
+ 6. On interconnection points where a firm day-ahead use-it-or-lose-it mechanism in accordance with paragraph 3 is applied, an evaluation of the relationship with the oversubscription and buy-back scheme pursuant to point 2.2.2 shall be carried out by the national regulatory authority, which may resu…
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+ 7. A national regulatory authority may decide to implement a firm day-ahead use-it-or-lose-it mechanism pursuant to paragraph 3 on an interconnection point. Before adopting its decision, the national regulatory authority shall consult with the national regulatory authorities of adjacent Member State…
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+ 2.2.4. **Surrender of contracted capacity**
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+ Transmission system operators shall accept any surrender of firm capacity which is contracted by the network user at an interconnection point, with the exception of capacity products with a duration of a day and shorter. The network user shall retain its rights and obligations under the capacity con…
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+ 2.2.5. **Long-term use-it-or-lose-it mechanism**
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+ 1. National regulatory authorities shall require transmission system operators to partially or fully withdraw systematically underutilised contracted capacity on an interconnection point by a network user where that user has not sold or offered under reasonable conditions its unused capacity and whe…
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+ (a) the network user uses less than on average 80 % of its contracted capacity both from 1 April until 30 September and from 1 October until 31 March with an effective contract duration of more than one year for which no proper justification could be provided; or
− 2.2. **Congestion-management procedures in the event of contractual congestion**
+ (b) the network user systematically nominates close to 100 % of its contracted capacity and renominates downwards with a view to circumventing the rules laid down in point 2.2.3(3).
− | 1. | In the event that contracted capacity goes unused, transmission system operators shall make that capacity available on the primary market on an interruptible basis via contracts of differing duration, as long as that capacity is not offered by the relevant network user on the secondary market…
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+ 2. The application of a firm day-ahead use-it-or-lose-it mechanism shall not be regarded as justification to prevent the application of paragraph 1.
− | 2. | Revenues from released interruptible capacity shall be split according to rules laid down or approved by the relevant regulatory authority. Those rules shall be compatible with the requirement of an effective and efficient use of the system. |
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+ 3. Withdrawal shall result in the network user losing its contracted capacity partially or completely for a given period or for the remaining effective contractual term. The network user shall retain its rights and obligations under the capacity contract until the capacity is reallocated by the tran…
− | 3. | A reasonable price for released interruptible capacity may be determined by the relevant regulatory authorities taking into account the specific circumstances prevailing. |
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+ 4. Transmission system operators shall regularly provide national regulatory authorities with all the data necessary to monitor the extent to which contracted capacities with effective contract duration of more than one year or recurring quarters covering at least two years are used.
− | 4. | Where appropriate, transmission system operators shall make reasonable endeavours to offer at least parts of the unused capacity to the market as firm capacity. |
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+ (e) in a downloadable format that has been agreed between transmission system operators and the national regulatory authorities — on the basis of an opinion on a harmonised format that shall be provided by the Agency — and that allows for quantitative analyses;
− (e) in downloadable format that allows for quantitative analyses;
+ (g) in the official language(s) of the Member State and in English;
+ 
+ (h) all data shall be made available as of 1 October 2013 on one Union-wide central platform, established by ENTSOG on a cost-efficient basis.
− (g) in the official language(s) of the Member State and in English.
+ 
+ (g) planned and unplanned interruptions to firm services as well as the information on restoration of the firm services (in particular, maintenance of the system and the likely duration of any interruption due to maintenance). Planned interruptions shall be published at least 42 days in advance;
+ (h) occurrence of unsuccessful, legally valid requests for firm capacity products with a duration of one month or longer including the number and volume of the unsuccessful requests; and
+ 
+ (i) in the case of auctions, where and when firm capacity products with a duration of one month or longer have cleared at prices higher than the reserve price;
+ 
+ (j) where and when no firm capacity product with a duration of one month or longer has been offered in the regular allocation process;
+ 
+ (k) total capacity made available through the application of the congestion-management procedures laid down in points 2.2.2, 2.2.3, 2.2.4 and 2.2.5 per applied congestion-management procedure;
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+ (l) points (h) to (k) shall apply from 1 October 2013.
− (g) planned and unplanned interruptions to firm services as well as the information on restoration of the firm services (in particular, maintenance of the system and the likely duration of any interruption due to maintenance). Planned interruptions shall be published at least 42 days in advance.