Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 of 14 July 2016 supplementing Directive (EU) 2015/849
as it stood on 2022-03-13, permalink: /eu-eurlex/32016r1675/2022-03-13
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The list of third-country jurisdictions which have strategic deficiencies in their anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism regimes that pose significant threats to the financial system of the Union (‘high-risk third countries’) is laid down in the Annex.
This Regulation shall enter into force on the third day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in the Member States in accordance with the Treaties.
High-risk third countries
I. High-risk third countries which have provided a written high-level political commitment to address the identified deficiencies and have developed an action plan with FATF.
| No | High-risk third country |
|---|---|
| 1 | Afghanistan |
| 2 | Barbados |
| 3 | Burkina Faso |
| 4 | Cambodia |
| 5 | Cayman Islands |
| 6 | Haiti |
| 7 | Jamaica |
| 8 | Jordan |
| 9 | Mali |
| 10 | Morocco |
| 11 | Myanmar |
| 12 | Nicaragua |
| 13 | Pakistan |
| 14 | Panama |
| 15 | the Philippines |
| 16 | Senegal |
| 17 | South Sudan |
| 18 | Syria |
| 19 | Trinidad and Tobago |
| 20 | Uganda |
| 21 | Vanuatu |
| 22 | Yemen |
| 23 | Zimbabwe |
II. High-risk third countries which have provided a high-level political commitment to address the identified deficiencies, and have decided to seek technical assistance in the implementation of the FATF Action Plan, which are identified by FATF Public Statement.
| No | High-risk third country |
|---|---|
| 1 | Iran |
III. High-risk third countries which present ongoing and substantial money-laundering and terrorist-financing risks, having repeatedly failed to address the identified deficiencies and which are identified by FATF Public Statement.
| No | High-risk third country |
|---|---|
| 1 | Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) |
Provenance and validity dates, identifier, hash
| as of | 2022-03-13 → this version applied |
| valid | 2022-03-13 → 2023-03-15 publisher-asserted |
| type | REG_DEL Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 of 14 July 2016 supplementing Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council by identifying high-risk third countries with strategic deficiencies (Text with EEA relevance) |
| language | en |
| published | 2022-03-13 |
| lex_id | eu-eurlex:32016r1675:2022-03-13 |
| record sha256 | 4ca2c0e32a1890d9f4ad8c167e8098a0d0b1f6aca27df53dfd89467968ac3482 |
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